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We apply non-linear error-correction models to the empirical testing of the sustainability of 
the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. Our empirical analysis, based on Italy, 
shows that the Italian government is meeting its intertemporal budget constraint, in spite of 
the high levels of public debt. Nevertheless, the burden of correcting budgetary disequilibria 
is entirely carried out by changes in the average tax rate, with a weakly exogenous 
government spending, possibly determined by the political process. We document some 
rigidities of the tax instrument, in terms of downward inflexibility of the average tax rate, not 
only with respect to its long-run level, but also during periods of decreasing economic growth. 
Further, we provide some evidence in favour of a non-linear adjustment towards a sustainable 
long-run equilibrium, as the average tax rate adjusts faster the farther away it is from the 
equilibrium. 
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The Treaties governing the European Monetary Union impose some relevant
constraints on the ￿scal policy of member states, limiting their autonomy in cre-
ating excessive debts and de￿cits1, as ￿scal disequilibria in one state can impose
relevant negative externalities on the stability of the other member countries,
as well as on the overall credibility of the common monetary policy. On the
other hand, given the common monetary policy, the correction of idiosyncratic
shocks is assigned to the ￿scal instrument alone, imposing further pressures on
the ￿scal policy of member countries.
The issue of the sustainability of the public ￿nances of the EMU member
countries has consequently received an increasing attention, but less attention
has been paid to the issue of how the sustainability is achieved, that is, how
do budgetary authorities adjust ￿scal policies to achieve/maintain a sustainable
path of public debt and de￿cit. Focussing on this adjustment by applying linear
and non-linear error-correction models is the main purpose of our paper.
Our empirical analysis is based on Italy, which provides an interesting case
as it joined the European Monetary Union in 1999, in spite of a stock of public
debt of around 113% of nominal GDP (against the 60% level required by the
Maastricht Treaty), and whose public accounts are often under scrutiny for
struggling to comply with the European Stability and Growth Pact2, as well
1Article 104 of the Maastricht Treaty (1993) imposes a ceiling to debt and de￿cit of 60%
and 3% of domestic GDP, respectively, as conditions for the admissions to the EMU. The
European Stability and Growth Pact (ESGP), signed in 1999 and revised in 2005, reinforces
the 3% ceiling for the government de￿cit of member countries, establishing an excessive de￿cit
procedure for violations of the rule.
2In particular, in July 2005 the Council of the European Union concluded, under the
excessive de￿cit procedure, that Italy had an excessive de￿cit and reccomended a correction
by 2007. In June 2008 the Council closed the procedure, as the Italian de￿cit had "been
brought below the 3% threshold in a credible and sustainable manner" (10127/1/09/REV1).
In October 2009, a new procedure has been opened (IP/09/1428).
2as for subsequent downgradings of its sovereign debt by the main credit ratings
agencies3.
In this paper, we address three main relevant policy questions. First, is the
Italian government￿ s intertemporal budget constraint respected? Second, is the
process of ￿scal adjustment equally shared by changes in revenues and changes
in government spending? Third, does ￿scal adjustment vary with the sign and
magnitude of disequilibria and/or with the state of the economy?
Our proposed approach provides a number of interesting ￿ndings.
The Italian government￿ s intertemporal budget constraint is formally re-
spected, in spite of the high levels of public debt. Nevertheless, the burden of
correcting budgetary disequilibria is entirely carried by changes in the average
tax rate, rather than changes in government spending or policy mixes. Govern-
ment spending is shown to be weakly exogenous, pointing to a "spend-and-tax"
adjustment, where the level of spending appears to be determined by the po-
litical process. We also ￿nd that taxes adjust more rapidly when deviations
from the equilibrium level get larger, as well as provide some evidence of down-
ward in￿ exibility of taxes, when these are above their long-run level. Further,
taxes increase rapidly during periods of accelerating economic growth, but are
downward in￿ exible during periods of decreasing economic growth.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical back-
ground of the sustainability of the government￿ s intertemporal budget con-
straint. Section 3 presents our long-run sustainability analysis, while Section 4
reports the ￿scal authorities￿reaction function to ￿scal disequilibria. Section 5
presents the main conclusions of the paper, as well as suggestions for further
3Standard & Poor￿ s now rates the Italian long term sovereign debt with an A+ and Fitch
with a A￿ , against the AA rating of 1998.
3research.
2 The Sustainability of the Government￿ s In-
tertemporal Budget Constraint.
Following Walsh (2003) and Bohn (2008), the nominal one-period consolidated
government-sector budget identity is given by:
Gt + it￿1Bt￿1 = Tt + (Bt ￿ Bt￿1) (1)
Where Gt represents the general government expenditure, net of interest
payments, Bt is the stock of government bonds sold to the private market,
it￿1Bt￿1 are the interest payments on the outstanding debt4, and Tt are the
tax revenues. All variables are in nominal terms, and, for simplicity, we ignore
the e⁄ect of seigniorage and surprise in￿ ation.
As all policy debates are in terms of GDP shares, we divide equation (1) by




















Letting ￿t be the output growth rate, and ￿t the in￿ ation rate, and rear-
ranging, we obtain the following compact debt dynamics:













4We assume the debt to be one-period in maturity, so that debt issued in period t￿1 earns
the nominal interest rate it￿1:
4Assuming a positive r, and constant over time; and taking the conditional
expectations of the variables, the path of the public debt for an arbitrary se-
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Equation (6) represents the government￿ s intertemporal budget constraint
(IBC).
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The IBC is met when the initial debt equals the expected present value





(1 + r)n = 0 (8)
5i.e. that the government does not adopt Ponzi games, by continuously relying
on the issue of new debt to pay the interest on the old debt.
The above condition can be interpreted as a bondholders￿ transversality
condition to be willing to hold public debt, as it reassures them about the
solvency of the government.
The empirical testing of the sustainability of the government￿ s IBC is gener-
ally based on the analysis of the past behaviour of the ￿scal policy variables, and
several empirical tests have been suggested in the literature, based on the sta-
tionarity of debt/de￿cit and/or on the cointegration between public revenues
and expenditures (see, e.g., .Hamilton and Flavin, 1986, Trehan and Walsh,
1988 and 1991, Wilcox, 1989, Hakkio and Rush, 1991, Quintos, 1995, Uctum
and Wickens, 2000, and Bohn, 2006). More recent work by Chortoreas et al.
(2008) introduces a non-linear stationary model as alternative hypothesis, while
a panel unit root/cointegration approach is used by Afonso and Rault (2008)
and a multicointegration approach is used by Leachman et al. (2005).
Following Afonso (2005), we initially test for cointegration between the GDP
shares of government spending and revenues, i.e. GOV and TAX. TAX is
the nominal general government revenues on nominal GDP, GOV denotes the
government share (i.e. nominal general government expenditure on nominal
GDP):
TAXt = a + bGOVt + ut (9)
We do not transform our variables into logs, as this will a⁄ect the cointe-
gration (Banerjee et al., 1993). Taking logs of a series magni￿es its ￿ uctuations
near zero, whereas sustainability is primarily concerned on how ￿scal policy
6recovers from high values of debt and outlays (Bohn, 2008). Given that both
revenues and spending are highly dependent on aggregate income, our short-run
models of Section 4 also allow for additional e⁄ects from nominal GDP.
In case the null of no cointegration between TAX and GOV cannot be re-
jected at conventional levels of statistical signi￿cance, then the governemnt￿ s
IBC is not met and consequently the ￿scal policy is considered unsustainable.
In case TAX and GOV result cointegrated, with and estimated b = 1, then
the government￿ s IBC is respected. In case there is cointegration between TAX
and GOV, but b < 1, then government spending grows faster than government
revenues, and the ￿scal policy in this case might not be sustainable.
There are nevertheless some shortcomings associated with the empirical test-
ing of the sustainability of the government￿ s IBC in a cointegration/unit root
analysis. All the sustainability tests are necessarily backward looking, as they
look at the past behaviour of the public ￿nance variables. We might argue,
on the other hand, that the fact that a country has consistently conducted its
public ￿nances in a sustainable way can provide a good indicator for its future
behaviour. Further, the sustainability tests do not take into account the as-
sets owned by the government, which in principle could be sold to the private
market. Finally, the sustainability tests implicitly consider the interest rate as
stationary.
Previous empirical evidence on the sustainability of the Italian IBC is contro-
versial: Feve and Henin (2000), Afonso (2005) and Galli and Padovano (2008),
all ￿nd that the Italian government ￿nances are on an unsustainable path. A
di⁄erent conclusion is reached by Greiner et al. (2007) and Uctum et al. (2006),
who provide evidence in favour of the sustainability of the Italian government￿ s
IBC, in spite of the high levels of public debt.
73 The empirical model: The long-run analysis.
3.1 Data and empirical methodology.
Given the discussion above, we empirically model the budgetary decisions of
Italy, based on annual Italian data over the period 1960 to 20085. Our use of
low frequency data allows us to capture the discretionary changes in budgetary
policy, that would be ruled out by higher frequency data (see e.g. Blanchard
and Perotti, 2002). Further, higher frequency data, that would provide higher
degrees of freedom in our estimates, are only available for a much shorter time
span.
Figure 1 plots TAX;GOV and ￿TAX;￿GOV . We notice that both the
revenues and expenditures shares on GDP have considerably grown over time,
reaching their peaks in the Nineties. In particular, at the start of our sample,
tax revenues accounted for 27% of national GDP, peaking in the late Ninenities
at around 47% of GDP. Government spending has followed a similar ascending
pattern, accounting for 28% of GDP at the start of our sample, and peaking
in the early Nineties at 56% of GDP. Preliminary analysis using di⁄erent unit
root tests suggests that both the revenue and the expenditure series are non-
stationary in levels6.
In order to test for cointegration between revenues and expenditures, we
estimate a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM; see Johansen, 1988) of the
form:
5The dataset is taken from AMECO and a full description of the variables can be found in
the Data Appendix.
6We have conducted the following unit root tests: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and
Fuller, 1979), Phillips-Perron (1998), Kwiatkoski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992), and Ng-Perron





￿i￿yt￿1 + ￿yt￿1 + ￿ + "t (10)
where yt = [TAX;GOV ]
0
is the set of non-stationary I(1) variables discussed
above, "t ￿ niid(0;￿);￿ is a drift parameter, and ￿ is a (p ￿ p) matrix of the
form ￿ = ￿￿
0 , where ￿ and ￿ are (p ￿ r) matrices of full column rank, with ￿
containing the r cointegrating vectors and ￿ carrying the corresponding loadings
in each of the r vectors. The VAR approach is preferred here as it provides the
advantage of allowing to model both revenues and expenditures as potentially
endogenous.
We set the lag length k equal to 2 based on the Akaike Information Criterion.
We test for cointegration between revenues and expenditures using Johansen￿ s
(1988) maximal eigenvalue (￿-max) and trace (￿-trace) statistics. To account
for our small sample, both tests use a small sample correction (for exact math-
ematical formulas, see e.g. Doornik and Hendry, 2000, p.282). Both the ￿-max
and the ￿-trace statistics reject the null of no cointegration in favor of one
cointegrating vector between revenues and expenditures7.
We can now test some relevant policy questions, namely: (a) is the
Italian government￿ s IBC respected? (b) is the burden of correcting budgetary
disequilibria equally shared by changes in revenues and changes in government
spending?, and (c) what is the speed of the process of correcting budgetary
disequilibria?
Hypotheses (a) and (b) can be tested via a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test,
which is distributed as a ￿2(1) under the null hypotheses of (i) proportional-
ity between revenues and expenditures and (ii) equal adjustment coe¢ cients,
7The ￿-max and ￿-trace statistics are equal to 10.23 (p-value=.07) and 13.82 (-value=.02),
respectively. The empirical evidence in favour of one cointegrating vector is therefore stronger
for the￿-trace test. The p-values are taken from MacKinnon et al. (1999).
9respectively.
The ￿rst hypothesis is not rejected, as the LR gives a value of 0.954 (p-
value=0.33). The second hypothesis is rejected, as the LR gives a value of 7.35
(p-value=0.00).
Given that the adjustment coe¢ cient on GOV is insigni￿cantly di⁄erent
from zero at 5 percent, as the LR test gives a value of 2.44 (p-value = 0.12),
government share is weakly exogenous in our model.
To check the robustness of the estimated long-run results, we also used the
fully modi￿ed (semi-parametric) OLS method of Phillips and Hansen (1990) for
estimation of a single cointegrating vector when there is endogeneity between
the TAX and GOV variables. The Phillips and Hansen (1990) procedure pro-
vided almost identical results; in particular, the estimate on GOV was equal to
0.951 (standard error=0.066). Figure 2 plots the deviations from the estimated
(restricted) relationship. Deviations appear at times quite persistent, suggesting
the possibility of non-linear error-correction adjustment, discussed later.
Recursive estimation is used to examine the stability of our cointegrating
results and therefore assess any changes over time in the estimated relationship
between the tax revenue and government shares of GDP. Figure 3 plots the
recursively estimated ￿-trace and ￿-max test statistics divided by the corre-
sponding 5% critical values. Values of these fractions greater than one indicate
stability of the cointegration results over time. The recursively estimated ￿-
trace test suggests cointegration in all cases but one. On the other hand, the
recursively estimated ￿-max test indicates cointegration only up to 1995; how-
ever, from 2000 onwards the fraction value reverts back to one slowly, signalling
a higher attention towards IBC sustainability.
Recursive estimation is also used to assess how the coe¢ cient on GOV
10has changed over time. Figure 4 plots the recursively estimated coe¢ cient
￿2￿standard errors. The time-path of the coe¢ cient on the government share
of GDP indicates that long-run revenue movements have been less sensitive to
expenditure movements in the mid 1980s and mid 1990s, after which one-by-one
movements become a norm, con￿rming the higher attention paid to the IBC in
recent years.
The speed of the ￿scal consolidation process (question (c) above), can be
inferred from the analysis of the impulse response of the cointegrating relation-
ship to system-wide shocks (this is the ￿persistence pro￿le analysis￿in Pesaran
and Shin, 1996). From Figure 5, this converges to zero rather slowly with 90
percent of the adjustment completed after 6 years. Deviations from the esti-
mated cointegrating relationship are therefore eliminated very slowly, rendering
the process of ￿scal consolidation rather slow.
3.2 Policy implications of the long-run analysis
What are the economic implications of the above statistical tests? The
presence of cointegration with a cointegrating vector of (1;￿1) points to a sta-
ble long-run co-movement of the revenues and expenditure shares of GDP, which
is generally interpreted, as discussed in Section 2, as an evidence for the sus-
tainability of ￿scal policy, that is, for the ability of the Italian government to
meet its IBC.
Weak exogeneity of government spending implies that the short-run adjust-
ment to correct budgetary disequilibria is done by changes in tax policy rather
than changes in government spending or even policy mixes. Government spend-
ing appears therefore to be exogenously decided by the political process, with
taxes adjusting consequently. This result is consistent with the spend-and-tax
11adjustment studied by Peacock and Wiseman (1979), and in line with previous
studies on Italy, adopting a di⁄erent speci￿cation of the model (see, e.g. Koren
and Stiassny 1998, Alesina and Perotti, 1996).
A slow ￿scal adjustment process operating through changes in taxes rather
than changes in government spending could be related to public expenditure
rigidities, not only due to multi-annual contracts and planning, but also due to
strong resistance against expenditure reductions arising both from the demand-
side and bureaucratic powers (see OECD, 2005, and Legrenzi and Milas, 2002).
The political instability of the country, typically associated with multi party
coalition governments8 and frequent general elections9, renders problematic the
achievement of the necessary consensus to politically unpopular spending cuts,
favoring therefore the prevalence of the adjustment via the tax-system, rather
than a policy mix. The necessary reforms of the welfare state, and of the pen-
sions system in particular, although debated for several years, are very slowly
put into place, due to strong public opposition in the form of widespread general
strikes (Reviglio, 2001). The low level of independence of the Italian Central
Bank for most of the sample considered, also resulted in a soft-budget con-
straint for the central government, favoring expenditure growth (see Koren and
Stiassny, 1998).
A burden of ￿scal consolidation entirely carried by taxes can have a serious
detrimental impact on the economy. Daveri and Tabellini (2000) identify tax
increases on labour and pro￿ts as the main cause of declining economic growth
and expansion of the shadow economy. This is certainly true for Italy where
8For a more detailed analysis of the link between coalition governments and lower ￿scal
responsibility, see Roubini and Sachs (1989), Grilli et al. (1991) and Alesina and Perotti
(1995).
9It is interesting to notice that in the time span considered here, Italian political life saw
47 governments and 14 general elections.
12the black market economy accounted for 25.8% of o¢ cial GDP in 1994, against
12.4% for the UK, 14.3% for France and 9.4% for the US (see Schneider and En-
ste, 2000). Further, Alesina and Ardagna (1998) show that ￿scal consolidations
based on tax increases alone are short-lived, unlike ￿scal consolidations based
on spending cuts. Bertola and Drazen (1993), Sutherland (1997) and Ardagna
(2004) also argue that spending cuts can have an expansionary (non-Keynesian)
e⁄ect on the economy, as opposed to increases in taxes.
4 The Adjustment towards Sustainability
4.1 Linear adjustment
As the null of cointegration between the tax and the expenditure shares of GDP
cannot be rejected at conventional levels of statistical signi￿cance, we proceed
to estimate the corresponding error-correction model, to understand how year-
to-year changes in taxes adjust the economy back towards a sustainable long-
run equilibrium, conditional on government spending which resulted weakly
exogenous in the previous section. We can intepret this error-correction model
as the ￿scal authorities￿ reaction function to budgetary disequilibria, in the
sense of deviations of taxes and spending from their long run equilibrium which
embeds a sustainable government￿ s IBC.
We initially estimate the short-run adjustment of taxes within a linear error
correction model To account for the possibility of European Monetary Union
e⁄ects, we also tried a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 from 1993 (when the
Maastricht Treaty was agreed) onwards and 0 elsewhere. The dummy variable
turned out to be statistically insigni￿cant, implying that the adjustment of the
Italian public ￿nances did not take place through structural changes in the
13revenue-expenditure patterns10.
To capture the e⁄ects of economic and accelerating economic growth we
also considered current and lagged values of ￿GDPt￿1 and ￿2GDPt￿1 as extra
regressors. We found some weak e⁄ect from ￿2GDPt￿1 only in the non-linear
error correction model reported in the following section.
The OLS estimates of the parsimonious linear error-correction model are
reported in Table 1(i).We tested and found signi￿cant non-linearities in the
residuals of the linear error correction model, using the Brock, Dechert and
Sheinkman (BDS, 1996) test statistic. The test is also discussed in Escribano
(2004)11. For this reason, we proceed to re-estimate the error-correction model
by allowing for asymmetric and non-linear error correction adjustment12.
4.2 Asymmetric and Non-linear Adjustment
The asymmetric error correction model is obtained by taking the deviations of
the cointegrating vector CVt￿1 around its mean value, and partitioning them





spectively). Results for the parsimonious asymmetric error-correction model
are reported in Table 1(ii). The results indicate that the speed of adjustment
varies depending on whether the estimated relationship is above or below its
equilibrium. The point estimates suggest that when taxes are lower than equi-
librium, they increase rapidly. On the other hand, when taxes are higher than
equilibrium, they fall slowly. Notice that the coe¢ cient on CV
￿
t￿1 is more than
10Italy quali￿ed to the European Monetary Union despite failing the debt criterion. Eco-
nomic adjustment was mainly driven by changes in monetary policy. In 1997, a ￿European
tax￿ was imposed on private households, as a one-o⁄ measure, and some ￿budgetary gim-
micks￿were used in order to qualify for the de￿cit criterion (see e.g. Reviglio, 2001).
11Results available on request.
12Asymmetric and non-linear error correction models have been introduced by Escribano
(1986). See also Granger and Lee (1989), Escribano and Granger (1998), Escribano and Pfann
(1998), Escribano and Aparicio (1999), and Escribano and Mira (2002), amongst others.
14twice as large (in absolute value) as the coe¢ cient on CV
+
t￿1. Nevertheless,




t￿1 is not rejected based on an F-
test (p-value= 0.38). Hence, in economic terms our results point to downward
in￿ exibility of taxes. Nevertheless, in terms of statistical tests, these results are
not clear-cut.
To obtain the non-linear error correction model, we add to the linear model
of Table 1(i) the squared and cubed values of the error-correction regressor, that
is, CV2
t￿1and CV3
t￿1. This type of non-linearities allows for a faster adjustment
when deviations from the equilibrium level get larger. Results for the parsi-
monious non-linear error correction are reported in Table 1(iii). The p-value
of the F test for the statistical signi￿cance of the CV3
t￿1 regressor is equal to
0.00, and the p-value of the F test for the joint signi￿cance of the CV2
t￿1and
CV3
t￿1 regressors is equal to 0.01, indicating (at the 5 percent level of statistical
signi￿cance) that adjustment back to equilibrium is stronger for large disequi-
librium deviations. We also report a weak positive e⁄ect on taxes from lagged
accelerating economic growth, possibly capturing the built-in progressivity of
the ￿scal system. We return to this issue more in detail below.
A comparison of the regression standard errors across models indicates that
the non-linear model has a better ￿t. This is also con￿rmed by recursive para-
meter stability tests (available by the authors on request).
Figure 6a and Figure 6b plot the asymmetric and non-linear adjustments
against the cointegrating vector, respectively. Figure 6a shows an asymmet-
ric adjustment of taxes, as deviations above equilibrium are corrected slower
compared to deviations below equilibrium. On the other hand, we notice from
Figure 6b that once disequilibrium deviations get larger, adjustment back to
equilibrium becomes stronger.
15To assess further the di⁄erences amongst the estimated models, we take a
closer look at the contribution of the error correction terms to changes in the tax
share of GDP. To do this, we plot in Figure 7 the values of the error correction
components of the linear, asymmetric and non-linear equations across time. The
linear model appears to be correcting more slowly with respect to the asymmet-
ric and non-linear ones, both when above and when below the equilibrium. Of
the three models, the non-linear one embeds a faster adjustment.
The presence of these asymmetries suggests the opportunity of analyzing
further the behavior of taxes in di⁄erent phases of the economic cycle. In par-
ticular, we investigate the possibility of asymmetric e⁄ects from accelerating
and decreasing economic growth on taxes, given the weak positive e⁄ect from
lagged accelerating growth (￿2GDPt￿1) on taxes reported in Table 1(iii). For





t￿1, respectively). Then we re-estimate the





t￿1 as separate regressors. The coe¢ cient on ￿2GDP
+
t￿1 is esti-
mated at 0.110 (t-ratio = 1.22). The coe¢ cient on ￿2GDP
￿
t￿1 is estimated
at 0.040 (t-ratio = .16) whereas the estimates of the remaining regressors are
almost identical to those of Table 1(iii). GDP symmetry is not rejected based
on an F-test (F=0.41, p-value = 0.53). On the other hand, the joint hypothe-
sis of symmetric GDP e⁄ects and linear error correction adjustment (in terms
of zero e⁄ects from CV2
t￿1 and CV3
t￿1) is rejected at 10 percent (F=2.86, p-
value= 0.07). Hence, there is some evidence of downward in￿ exibility of taxes
during periods of decreasing economic growth as the coe¢ cient on ￿2GDP
￿
t￿1
is four times lower than the coe¢ cient on ￿2GDP
+
t￿1, which in turn is statis-
tically insigni￿cant. We believe that this result deserves more attention and
16possibly further analysis in the direction of planning an adequate strategy of
tax-smoothing, to avoid taxes to become more pressing during economic down-
turns.
This result strengthens our conclusions with respect to the weaknesses of the
spend-and-tax adjustment, suggesting policy-makers to adopt a higher degree
of caution when pursuing measures of ￿scal consolidation relying exclusively on
a unique instrument.
5 Conclusions
This paper performs an empirical analysis of the sustainability of the Italian
public ￿nances between 1960 and 2008. We provide robust evidence in favour
of cointegration between taxes and government spending, with a cointegrat-
ing vector of (1;￿1). This result is generally interpreted as that the Italian
government￿ s IBC is sustainable. We ￿nd nevertheless that the year-to-year
adjustments to correct budgetary disequilibria are made entirely via changes
in taxes, rather than spending cuts or policy mixes, as the government spend-
ing share on GDP resulted weakly exogenous. This result is in line with the
spend-and-tax model, where government spending is determined by the political
process and taxes adjust consequently. We also document some rigidities in the
tax instrument, particularly in terms of downward in￿ exibility of the average
tax rate during periods of decreasing economic growth, pointing to a regressive
use of the tax instrument.
Taken together, our results point to a relevant wekness of the Italian public
￿nances, questioning the emphasis put on the sustainability analysis alone in
previous studies, and con￿rming the importance of analysing the adjustment
process towards a sustainable IBC.
17Our work can be extended in several ways. Ter￿svirta (1998) pointed out
that non-linear models with quadratic and cubic error correction terms are ￿rst-
order approximations to smooth transition autoregression models, where the
transition mechanism between di⁄erent regimes is driven by the disequilibrium
error. In the context of our public ￿nance model, it would be interesting to
estimate a two-regime smooth transition model where adjustment takes place
in every period but the speed of the adjustment as well as the impact of the
lagged values of expenditure and taxes vary conditional on whether disequilib-
rium deviations from the expenditure/taxes relationship are large or small.
It would also be interesting to examine whether non-linear adjustment can
be elevated into a stylized fact, by considering tax and government spending
adjustment in other countries, as well as at a local government level. If it can,
then non-linearities in taxes and spending might be incorporated into existing
non-linear models of ￿scal policy (see e.g. Giavazzi et al., 2000). We intend to
address these issues in future research.
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24Data Appendix
The data used for this paper are taken from the annual macro-economic database
of the European Commission￿ s Directorate General for Economic and Financial
A⁄airs (AMECO).
The statistical de￿nitions of the series are:
TAX: Total revenue; general government; ESA 1995 (URTG)
Total government revenue is the sum of: Sales of market output (ESA 95-
code P.11) and output- for own ￿nal use (P.12) + Payments for other non-market
output (P.131) + Other subsidies on production (D.39), receivable + Taxes on
production and imports (D.2), receivable + Property income (D.4), receivable
+ Current taxes on income and wealth (D.5), receivable + Social contributions
(D.61), receivable + Other current transfers (D.7), receivable + Capital transfers
(D.9), receivable.
G:Total expenditure; general government; ESA 1995 (UUTG)
Total general government expenditure is the sum of: Intermediate consump-
tion (P.2) + Gross capital formation (P.5) + Compensation of employees (D.1),
payable + Other taxes on production (D.29), payable + Subsidies (D.3), payable
+ Property income (D.4), payable + Current taxes on income and wealth (D.5),
payable + Social bene￿ts other than social transfers in kind (D.62), payable +
Social transfers in kind related to expenditure on products supplied to house-
holds via market producers (D.6311 + D.63121 + D.63131), payable + Other
current transfers (D.7), payable + Adjustment for the change in the net eq-
uity of households on pension funds reserves (D.8)13 + Capital transfers (D.9),
13The adjustment for the change in net equity of households in pension funds reserves (D.8)
represents the adjustment needed to make appear in the saving of households the change
in the actuarial reserves on which households have a de￿nite claim. Accordingly, it is part
of the expenditure of the insurance enterprises sector and other sectors administering non-
autonomous pension funds (see ESA 1995, paragraph 4.141 and 4.144).
25payable + Acquisitions of non-produced non-￿nancial assets (K.2)
GDP: GDP (reference level for excessive de￿cit procedure)
Gross domestic product at current market prices ; Reference level for exces-
sive de￿cit procedure (UVGDH).
26Table 1: OLS estimates of alternative error correction models for ΔTAX 
 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii) 
  Linear model  Asymmetric model  Non-linear model 
      
Constant    0.003  (2.120)    0.002  (0.535)    0.005  (0.825) 
ΔGOVt    0.234  (2.572)    0.236  (1.960)    0.260  (2.051) 
CV t-1   -0.100 (-2.818)    -    0.010  (0.100) 
CV
2 t-1    -    -   -0.131  (0.970) 
CV
3 t-1    -    -  -39.239 (-3.062) 
CV
+ t-1    -   -0.050  (-0.740)    - 
CV
- t-1    -   -0.132  (-1.770)    - 
Δ
2GDPt-1        0.231 (1.032) 
      
Diagnostics      
Regression s.e.    0.010    0.008    0.001 
2 R     0.255    0.290    0.330 
Far     0.41 [0.66]    0.48 [0.61]    0.67 [0.51] 
Farch     0.08 [0.76]    0.03 [0.86]    0.74 [0.39] 
χ
2nd     4.56 [0.10]    1.11 [0.37]    5.47 [0.06] 





t-1 effects  
  -    0.72 [0.38]    - 




  -    -    8.98 [0.00] 






  -    -    4.72 [0.01] 
 
Notes: t-ratios in parentheses. Far is the Lagrange Multiplier F-test for 
2
nd order serial correlation. Farch is the 1
st order ARCH F-test. χ
2nd is a 
Chi-square test for normality. Numbers in square brackets are the p-
values of the tests. 
2 R is the adjusted coefficient of determination.   
CV = TAX – GOV, in mean corrected form.   1
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Figure 5: Persistence profile of the cointegrating vector to system-wide shocks 
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Figure 6: Asymmetric and non-linear adjustment 
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Figure 7: Error correction components of the linear, asymmetric and non-linear 
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